COP29: Even under a Trump Presidency, not all is lost

The United Nations annual climate change conference, COP29, will focus on mobilizing climate finance, as trillions of dollars are required for countries to drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions and protect lives and livelihoods from the worsening impacts of climate change. In Baku, countries hope to replace the current commitment of 100 billion US dollar per year with a higher number that will match more closely what developing countries need to decouple economic growth from carbon dioxide emissions and adapt to a warmer world. 

Little room for manoeuvre for the US delegation in Baku

Yet, the US delegation at COP29 in Baku will have its hands tied. It cannot make credible commitments regarding US contributions because the incoming government will change the course of US engagement. For one, Donald Trump has campaigned on withdrawing the US from the Paris Agreement because he perceives the latter to favour China over the US. There are also speculations that he might pull out the US from the broader UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to make it harder for a next administration to rejoin these international climate institutions. In either case, financial commitments that would allow other countries to green their economies will not be forthcoming. Prominent conservative think-tanks that have helped prepare Trump’s second term in office push the incoming government to do even more on that front. For example, the American Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 also calls upon “the next conservative Administration [to] rescind all climate policies from its foreign aid programs” and to “shut down the [USAID] agency’s offices, programs, and directives designed to advance the Paris Climate Agreement.”  

Consequences of a new US Administration for climate goals

A failure of COP29 to agree on a new quantitative target for climate finance will mean two things. First, even if other industrialized nations as well as China may be willing to close some of the gap, developing countries will need to stem more of their climate adaptation costs themselves. Second, developing countries will have less means to finance their own climate mitigation efforts. As a result, their own climate targets will likely be more modest than in a world with US contributions to international climate finance. 

This second consequence brings us to COP30 which will take place at the end of 2025 in Brazil. With the Paris Agreement operating in five-year cycles, this year’s conference in Baku is the run-up to the even more important conference next year. In 2025, all states will be asked to submit their new “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs) for the period from 2025 to 2030, and the Paris Agreement asks them to step up their ambition for every new five-year cycle. The US government was expected to submit its new NDC in the spring 2025, sending an important signal to other states well ahead of COP30. If the USA withdraws from the Paris Agreement, this signal will disappear.

This does not mean the Paris Agreement is dead. Because the agreement relies on nationally determined contributions, states define their own targets in line with what they observe other states to be doing. Ultimately, it may thus not matter so much whether the US is a party to the agreement. What matters more for international climate cooperation are US emission trends and projections. 

Global environmental policy and the value of counter movements

To be sure, the outlook is bleak. Trump has called climate change a “hoax” and he put climate change denialists and fierce opponents of climate regulation in charge of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) during his first term in office. In this year’s campaign, Trump has stressed his intent to enhance rather than limit oil production. He announced he would roll back the Inflation Reduction Act which provides tax cuts for businesses that invest in a green transition. The America First Policy Institute he tasked with organising the transition into government has vowed to end the “left’s war on energy”, echoing Project 2025 in its call to “stop the war on oil and natural gas” and to “end the climate policy fanaticism that advantages Beijing”. But despite all these announcements and ambitions, US emissions will be heavily influenced by decisions taken at the state level as well as by businesses. In a context in which international competitors are moving towards decarbonization at a high speed, many US states and firms will face incentives to follow that trend. 

While it may thus seem as if the consequences for climate politics will be devastating, this is far from sure. States and businesses will continue to make their own decisions based on their need to attract investment and remain competitive in a world that will become warmer, but also more carbon restricted. Key provisions of the Biden Administration’s Inflation Reduction Act are likely to remain in place because the constituents of Republican members of Congress benefit from the investments they have generated. And last, but not least, Trump’s reluctance to address the climate crisis is likely to mobilize people. Much like during his first presidency, it will motivate young people with a concern for climate policy into political action, whether taking to the streets or seeking office. And much like during Trump’s first presidency, the defiance of a Trump Administration will empower the transnational social movement that fights against climate change. When Trump claims that his success results from ‘the greatest political movement of all time’, we should not forget that every political movement generates a countermovement.

Prof. Dr. Klaus Dingwerth is a political scientist at the School of Economics and Political Science (SEPS-HSG) at the University of St.Gallen.

Image: Unsplash / Matthew TenBruggencate