"Climate policy is always a question of justice" – an interview with Klaus Dingwerth

Klaus Dingwerth is Professor of Political Science at the University of St.Gallen. His research focuses on global environmental policy, international organisations and the possibilities of democratic governance beyond the nation state. In his latest book "Klimagerechtigkeit - zur Einführung" (Junius Verlag, 2025), he sheds light on what constitutes a just climate policy - and why it is crucial to consider the social dimensions of the climate crisis. In the interview, he categorises current developments and explains why climate justice is both ethically and politically central.

On the one hand, direct experience of the consequences of the climate crisis could increase support for climate policies, including in countries such as Switzerland. On the other hand, the escalation of the climate crisis raises new distribution issues. Who will bear the costs of climate protection, adaptation, damage and losses? How will the necessary funds be raised? How will we support those who lose their jobs as a result of the transition to a climate-friendly economy? The associated distributional struggles promote the polarisation of climate policy.

In the UK, more than 80 per cent of farmers expressed concern about the impact of climate change on their livelihoods, according to a survey reported in The Guardian. Are similar developments also emerging in Switzerland?

I am observing a kind of "endgame" around climate policy. For example, a group of British and North American researchers argue that the best way to understand climate policy is as a dispute between the owners of climate-forcing and climate-vulnerable assets, in which some players' very existence is at stake.

‘Climate-forcing assets’ are closely linked to the extraction and combustion of fossil fuels. If governments promote the decarbonisation of their economies, these values will decrease; if emissions are reduced to zero, the climate-damaging values will also decrease towards zero. ‘Climate-vulnerable assets’, on the other hand, are threatened by the consequences of the climate crisis. This applies to coastal factories as well as ski resorts in the Alps. The value of such assets decreases with every tenth of a degree by which the global average temperature continues to rise, sometimes with equally existential consequences.

Agriculture is affected by both dynamics. It releases greenhouse gases and is experiencing productivity losses due to climate change. In an 'existential climate policy', it must prepare for a variety of scenarios alongside. The concerns are therefore understandable.

In November, the "Initiative for a social climate policy" will be put to the vote in Switzerland, which, among other things, provides for an inheritance tax on very large fortunes in favour of climate protection. According to "SRF News", it is likely to polarise the voting campaign. How do you categorise this proposal?

Both climate protection and climate adaptation require financial resources. Experts typically advocate the internalization of environmental costs through carbon taxes or emission certificates. The advantage of these is that they make environmentally harmful behaviour more expensive while generating revenue to finance climate measures. However, such levies are often politically challenging to implement.

An inheritance tax takes a different approach. It follows the 'ability to pay' principle. In debates on justice, this principle is usually invoked when polluters or beneficiaries cannot be adequately prosecuted. In such cases, alternative sources of funding are needed to pay for the damage already caused or to avert further damage.

Taxing large inheritances could be one such alternative. However, the value of the initiative can also lie elsewhere: it sparks public debate about how to finance the transition to a low-carbon economy. Democratic societies will have to decide for themselves which path to take — the initiative is part of the negotiation process.

The climate crisis is also evident in cultural and sporting contexts: during the European Women's Football Championship in Switzerland, matches had to be played at over 30 degrees - a topic that was picked up by Reuters, among others. What role do such everyday experiences play in public perception - and can they contribute to political mobilisation?

Such everyday experiences can make the consequences of climate change more tangible for many people, increasing awareness of the issue. They demonstrate that climate change affects not only distant regions, but also our everyday lives. However, such experiences do not seem to generate widespread political mobilisation. Images and reports of severe natural disasters, such as floods, forest fires, landslides and hurricanes, continue to have a greater impact on public perception and political debate.

A report, article, piece on "SRF Wissen" recently discussed how difficult it has become to talk constructively about climate change. In your opinion, what are the prerequisites for a constructive dialogue?

In an 'existential climate policy', objective political discourse is difficult to achieve — some of the stakeholders simply have no interest in it. If these actors have significant financial resources, the polarisation of public discourse is inevitable.

By contrast, objective, solutions-oriented debate is more successful in formats in which concrete proposals relating to climate change transformation and adaptation are developed. Citizens' councils are a good example of this approach. In these councils, randomly selected citizens develop climate policy solutions at a local, regional or national level. Their random composition enables them to overcome existing divides between different stakeholder groups and develop solutions that many people can accept.

In your book "Climate Justice – An Introduction", you analyse why questions of justice must be at the heart of a legitimate and effective long-term climate policy. Which of your considerations seem particularly relevant to you in light of current developments?

Firstly, the climate crisis is also a justice crisis, affecting relations between states and within societies. If we overlook this, we will not be able to adequately understand or counter the current shifts in the international order or the polarisation of our societies.

Secondly, climate justice encompasses more than just distributive justice. The escalation of the climate crisis raises many distributional issues, so climate justice must always involve inclusive and fair decision-making processes, recognising different stakeholder groups and their specific realities. The three dimensions of climate justice are closely linked: just distribution is most likely to result from fair procedures, and fair decision-making procedures presuppose the recognition and adequate involvement of relevant stakeholder groups.

Thirdly, climate justice is a process. To master it, we need an approach to climate justice that can be translated into practical steps and motivate action. If climate justice norms primarily trigger feelings of guilt and shame among those they are addressed to, I fear that many will turn away from these norms. This must not happen, because ultimately, what matters is what works.

If you had to summarise the core of your argument in one sentence: What makes a climate policy fair and how can this be measured in concrete terms?

Here is a test: could we agree to a climate policy with good reasons, even if we did not know at the time of our agreement which society, which generation and which social class we would belong to one day? If we answer yes to this question, there is much to suggest that climate policy is fair. If not, we should look for ways to improve it - and always bear in mind that time is of the essence.

The book Klimagerechtigkeit - zur Einführung" by Prof Dr Klaus Dingwerth was published by Junius Verlag in 2025.

Image: Unsplash / Markus Spiske